讲座题目：Who Should Donate? A Socially Responsible Supply Chain with Prosocial Customers
主讲人：清华大学 肖勇波教授
讲座时间：2024年3月14日上午9:00---12:00
讲座地点：重庆大学B区经济与工商管理学院101报告厅
主讲人简介：
肖勇波，清华大学经济管理学院管理科学与工程系长聘正教授。2000年获清华大学管理信息系统学士学位，2006年获清华大学管理科学与工程硕士和博士学位，2006~2008清华大学经济管理学院应用经济学博士后。担任国际学术期刊《Naval Research Logistics》的副主编和《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》的执行编辑；担任《中国管理科学》、《系统工程理论与实践》、《系统管理学报》等国内期刊的编委。研究论文入选2021年度F5000中国精品科技期刊顶尖学术论文，撰写的建言献策报告被全国政协、教育部、北京市政协、民进中央、新华社采纳。主要研究领域包括收益与定价管理、运营与供应链管理等，主持了多项国家自然科学基金项目（包括青年、面上、重点项目、重大项目等），学术论文发表在Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、IIE Transactions、Decision Sciences、Naval Research Logistics等国际学术期刊以及《系统工程理论与实践》、《中国管理科学》、《管理科学学报》等国内学术刊物上。长期讲授“运筹学”“数据、模型与决策”“运营管理”等课程。
讲座摘要：
Donations to the "bottom of the pyramid" in less developed areas have been widely adopted by manufacturers and retailers involved in the supply chain to exercise corporate social responsibility efficiently. In addition to generating social benefits (i.e., donation value), donations can also contribute to building a brand's reputation and expanding its customer base, as today's consumers are increasingly socially responsible. This study addresses the question of whether a firm should engage in direct donations or opt for a "free ride" by leveraging other supply chain members' donation initiatives to improve operational performance. Specifically, we consider a socially responsible supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, who seek to maximize his/her mixed objective, i.e., a weighted sum of their respective profit and donation value. Both firms consider donation as a means of managing demand, which depends on the total donation amount. Using a Stackelberg game, we study the interactive donation and inventory decisions across the supply chain. We show that in equilibrium, only one firm donates and the other free rides. To encourage both firms to participate in donation and enhance their overall performance, including profitability and donation value, we consider a collaborative donation approach. Specifically, one firm could offer monetary incentives to its supply chain partner in the form of price discounts or refunds, contingent upon the partner making charitable donations. Such a collaborative donation approach can always benefit the firm offering the monetary incentives, while paradoxically it may harm its supply chain partner (who receives the discounts or refunds). Finally, we propose a new type of contract to coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement for both firms.
