讲座嘉宾：陈虹桥 副教授

讲座时间：2025年12月16日（星期二）上午10:00

讲座地点：重庆大学沙坪坝校区B校园经济与工商管理学院602会议室

嘉宾简介：陈虹桥，南京大学工程管理学院准聘副教授，博士生导师，博士毕业于中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院，期间受国家留学基金委资助赴多伦多大学Rotman管理学院联合培养，加入南京大学之前，曾在香港中文大学、香港理工大学学习和访问。研究方向包括收益管理、排队博弈、供应链管理等。以第一/通讯作者身份在Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management、Naval Research Logistics等知名学术期刊上发表多篇学术论文。获2023年度M&SOM最佳论文提名奖、第十八届江苏省哲学社会科学成果奖一等奖、首届江苏省运筹学会青年科技奖。

讲座摘要：When a firm sets a price for its product and sells to a market of customers with heterogeneous private valuations, the price divides the total pie of the social welfare into the firm's profit and consumer surplus. We introduce a socially responsible scheme, referred as the (α,θ)-CSR scheme, which generalizes the well-documented α-fairness notion and aims to generate consumer surplus to be a fraction of the social welfare at the CSR level θ. The objective function of the (α,θ)-CSR scheme varies with the value of the fairness coefficient α.We show that for any fairness coefficient, the firm's sacrifice in its profit always leads to a greater increase in consumer surplus, which suggests that a little CSR can go a long way. For any given customer valuation distribution and CSR level, we show that a smaller (resp., greater) fairness coefficient always leads to a lower price, generating more consumer surplus and social welfare but a lower profit when the CSR level is (resp. not) sufficiently high. Moreover, when the firm has to commit to a scheme with a specific α before knowing the valuation distribution, for the same CSR level, a greater fairness coefficient is robustly preferred from the profit perspective when the CSR level is sufficiently high, because it leads to higher worst-case lower and best-case upper profit bounds; a smaller one is robustly preferred from the consumer surplus and social welfare perspectives. Furthermore, we demonstrate that all bounds remain unchanged if the firm additionally knows the mean customer valuation. Finally, we extend the (α,θ)-CSR scheme from the single-product setting to an oligopoly pricing setting by establishing the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. We numerically find that a single CSR-driven firm can achieve most of the consumer surplus gains attainable when all firms adopt CSR at the same level.